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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation, written as part of the LLM in “Transnational and European 
Commercial Law, Arbitration, Mediation and Energy Law” at the International Hellenic 
University addresses the EU law challenges on investor-state arbitration under intra-
EU BITs, concluded by countries of Central and Easter Europe newly acceded to EU, 
taking as example the legal issues that emerged in Micula arbitration. The arguments 
posed by the EC and respondent states against the validity and applicability of intra-EU 
BITs have been proved unsubstantial, while the applicability of EU law on the merits by 
investment tribunals portrays their failure to strike a balance between the EU law 
obligations of states and the legitimate expectations of investors under the BITs. The 
main challenge concerns the compliance of intra-EU investment awards with EU state 
aid law, arguing that only compliance with an award mandating indirectly illegal state 
aid, such as the Micula award, violates art.107 TFEU. Compliance with such awards 
rendered under ICSID Convention places the respondent state in a dilemma, namely to 
respect EU state aid law and defy the consequences derived from the award or to 
honor ICSID Convention and unconditionally enforce it. Since the relationship between 
EU law and ICSID Convention remains unresolved, the superiority of each legal order 
would be established as a principle and not as a rule in the dispute at hand. With 
respect to non-ISCID awards involving competition law issues, their enforcement 
would be denied under the public policy exception V(2)(b) of NYC by the EU MS courts. 
Concluding that EU competition law forms EU public policy which is included in 
international public policy that applies in NYC, the court should verify through 
restrained review if the enforcement of the award entails flagrant violation of 
competition law, capable of jeopardizing the public policy of the state which 
enforcement is sought. These conclusions are premised on an attempt to reconcile EU 
law policy with the policy of law of international arbitration.      
Keywords: intra-EU BITs, Micula award, state aid, enforcement, public policy.         
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PREFACE 
I could not imagine that the world of international arbitration and European 
law could hide such mysteries in the context of enforcement of intra-EU investment 
arbitral awards. My interest was triggered with the issuance of an intra-EU ICSID 
investment arbitral award, the Micula award. This award mandated the re-installment 
of state aid measure which had been considered as incompatible with article 107 
TFEU. The enforcement of this award raised an array of legal issues mirroring a 
formidable debate between EU state aid law and ICSID Convention, a conflict between 
European Law and international law. This complex and improbable interaction of these 
competing legal orders made me to leave my comfort zone and write a thesis 
addressing the issue of EU state aid law as a limit to compliance with intra-EU 
investment arbitral awards in order to fulfill my graduation requirements for the 
acquisition of the degree LLM in “Transnational and European Commercial Law, 
Arbitration, Mediation and Energy Law” from the International Hellenic University. I 
hope this thesis to shed light into the legal problems that are emerging in this context 
and to commence a discussion on how these hindrances could be overcome in order to 
prevent states, such as Romania in the case concerned, from being in a quandary, 
namely to choose to respect their European law obligations and breach international 
law or to honor their international obligations and violate European law.                                                                      
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
EU law has integrated into investment law with the passage of time, setting an 
end to the era of parallelism of these regimes.1This interaction has been intensified 
after the collapse of the communist era when a new legal order emerged for the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe2wishing to be free market economies.3 
Romania was one of these states which was struggling to reborn from its ashes by 
resorting to privatizations, legal reforms and foreign investments, ensuring a reliable 
system of investment protection4through the conclusion of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties.5However, the accession of CEE states to the EU sharpened this tension with 
respect to the compatibility of EU law in recently acceded MSs with their preexisting 
treaties protecting foreign investment.  
This tension was mirrored in the Micula a.o. v Romania6case in which 
compensation was awarded in favour of the investors due to Romania’s failure to 
ensure a fair and equitable treatment under Romania and Sweden Bilateral Investment 
Treaty.7The bone of contention was the revocation of economic incentives to 
disadvantaged regions where Micula brothers had invested. The European 
Commission,8during the proceedings, intervened as amicus curiae and raised the issue 
                                                     
1
G. A. Bermann, ‘Navigating EU Law and the Law of International Arbitration’, Arbitration International, 
Vol.28, Issue 3, 2012, p.397. 
 
2
Hereafter referred as countries of CEE. 
 
3
H. Wehland, ‘Intra-EU investment agreements and arbitration: is European Community law and 
obstacle?’, International &Comparative Law Quartely, 2009, p.298. 
 
4
S. Wilske, L. Market, L. Braauninger, ‘Chapter IV: Investment Arbitration, Pertinent Issues in Investment 
Arbitration against Romania: A Case Study in Challenges and Pitfalls of Investment Disputes in Central 
and Easter Europe’ in G. Zeiler, I. Welser, et al.(eds.), Austrian Yearbook on International Arbitration, 
2015, pp.477-478.  
 
5
Hereafter referred as BITs.  
6
ICSID Case No ARB/05/20, Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula, SC European Food SA, SC Starmill SRI, SC 
Multipack SRL v Romania, final award, 11 December 2013, hereafter referred as Micula award.  
 
7
Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden and the Government of Romania on 
the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, entered into force in 2003. Hereafter referred 
as Sweden-Romania BIT. 
 
8
Hereafter referred as EC.  
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that any compensation for the loss of these privileges would constitute a new illegal 
state aid under EU law and the award would be unenforceable within the EU.9The 
tribunal’s failure to engage with EU state aid law rules with regard to enforceability of 
the award, led to a suspension injunction10by the EC requiring the government to 
suspend the execution of the award. The EC’s decision was challenged before the 
General Court11by Micula brothers who have presented the case as a conflict between 
international and European law on the grounds of violations of art.351(1) TFEU and 
art.4(3) TEU which safeguard the respect of international obligations of Romania under 
the ICSID Convention and the applicable BIT.  
This case sparked a debate regarding the EU law challenges to investor-state 
arbitration, portrayed in the context of intra-EU BITs12after the accession of CEE states 
to the EU. The aim of this thesis is not to provide a thorough analysis of EU law 
challenges to investment arbitration, but to provide a well rounded understanding of 
the relationship of EU law with international investment law, taking the “Micula” 
award as a food for thought. Although a jurisdictional issue of the tribunal as a conflict 
between the BIT and EU law was not raised, it is considered necessary to highlight the 
arguments raised by the EC and the respondent states against the very existence and 
applicability of intra-EU BITs for acceded CEE countries to EU. In a similar vein, the 
applicability of EU law in investment arbitration will be addressed, which is inextricably 
related with the enforceability of the award within EU. In light of the later, the issue of 
whether or not a compensation award constitutes illegal state aid under art.107(1) 
TFEU will be discussed.                                                                                                                
                                                     
9
Micula award (n.6), para.330. 
10
According to article 11(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999. 
11
CJEU, Case T-646/14, Action brought on 2 September 2014, Micula a.o. v Commission, OJ C 439/29, 
pending. 
12
These are treaties which are concluded between the “old” EU Member States with “new” EU Member 
States, namely with CEE countries before their accession to EU. See C. Söderlund, ‘Intra-EU BIT 
Investment Protection and the EC Treaty’, Journal of International Arbitration, Vol.24, Issue 5, 2007, 
p.455.  
 3 
Being aware of the EC Decision13which characterized the execution of the 
award as illegal state aid under EU law, Romania was under a dilemma, namely to 
respect EU law or international law. So, the purpose of this thesis is to initiate a 
discussion so as to eliminate such quagmire by reconciling the demands of EU law and 
law of international arbitration. To this end, the legal issues emerged from the 
enforcement of investment arbitral awards having the same factual background with 
the Micula case will be mentioned. With regard to intra-EU ICSID “Micula-type” awards 
in the enforcement stage, the unresolved relationship between the competing legal 
orders, asserting superiority-namely the ICSID Convention14claiming unconditional 
enforcement of the award under art.54 and the EU law claiming supremacy over 
international law-will be presented, concluding as a solution to this endless conflict a 
harmonious co-existence of them in the light of the Bosphorus case of the European 
Court of Human Rights.15 
With respect to the enforcement of intra-EU non-ICSID “Micula-type” awards, 
the courts of MSs may refuse the recognition and the enforcement of such award 
under the public policy exception of art.V(2)(b) of New York Convention16due to the 
Eco Swiss doctrine. Ergo, this notion of public policy will be analyzed, focusing on the 
content on European public policy and in particular whether any or all the rules of 
competition law pertain to European public policy. Assuming that Competition law is 
part of European public policy, the different approaches taken by the courts of MSs 
with respect to the review of the awards raising competition law issues will be 
mentioned. Finally, a standard of review will be proposed aiming to strike a balance 
between the principle of the finality of awards and the necessity of effective 
enforcement of EU competition law.  
                                                     
13
Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1470 of 30 March 2015 on State aid SA.38417(2014/C) (ex 2014/NN) 
implemented by Romania-Arbitral award Micula v Romania of 11 December 2013, OJ L 232, 4.9.2014, 
pp.43-70,available from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015D1470&from=EN, (accessed on 14-11-2015). 
 
14
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States. 
Hereafter referred as ICSID Convention.  
 
15
Hereafter referred as ECtHR.           
     
16
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, New York, 1958 (New York       
Convention). Hereafter referred as NYC. 
  
 4 
In this context, the Micula award would be the starting point of this work which 
shall unfold, through case law and academic literature, specific legal issues raised due 
to the clash of EU law with the law of international arbitration.     
     
 5 
CHAPTER I. “MICULA V ROMANIA” AWARD AND POST-AWARD 
DEVELOPMENTS. 
In an ICSID award issued in 2013, compensation of RON 376.433.229 plus 
interest17awarded in favour of the Micula brothers against Romania due to a breach 
of the fair and equitable treatment under the Sweden-Romania BIT. The premature 
revocation of the Emergency Government Ordinance 24/1998 (EGO 24),18granting to 
certain investors, tax and customs duty incentives in disfavored regions19for a period 
of ten years, as a precondition for Romania’s accession to EU,20was the factual  
background of the dispute in question. In other words, the abrogation of this 
investment scheme was essential step for the alignment of Romania’s legislation to 
EU state aid rules. This scheme had already been qualified as illegal stated aid 
according to the No.44/2000 Decision of Romanian Competition Council which was 
consistent with the legal framework for Romania’s accession to the EU, as it was 
provided in the Europe Agreement between Romania and European Community, 
entered into force in 1995. The later decision envisaged amendments to the existing 
ECO 24, included in the draft EGO 75. Romania’s failure to comply with these 
amendments, led the Competition Council to enforce its decision before the 
Romanian Courts without result because of the dismissal of its action on admissibility 
grounds.21In 2004, Romania revoked all the incentives included in EGO 24, as 
amended by EGO 75 with the exemption of Profit Tax Facility. The revocation of the 
                                                     
17
Compensation of EUR 82.000 million according to the exchange rate of European Central Bank on 
the day of the issuance of the award was awarded to the Micula brothers (1 EUR= 4,45 RON). By 11 
December 2013 the total liability held by Romania to the Micula brothers amounted to RON 
791.882.452 or EUR 178.000 million. For the precise presentation of damages with the interest 
calculated, see Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1470 of 30 March 2015, (n.13), para.27. 
 
18
The Emergency Ordinance 24/98 was consisted of a Machinery Facility, a Raw Materials Facility and 
a Profit Tax Facility. For an analytical description of the investment scheme see Commission Decision 
(EU) 2015/1470 of 30 March 2015, (n.13), para.14. 
19
According to the decision of 25 March 1999 of Romania’s Government, the mining region of Stei-
Nucet, Bihor country was characterized as a disadvantaged area for a period of 10 years, commencing 
on 1 April 1999. See Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1470 of 30 March 2015, (n.13), para.15. 
20
Romania was acceded to European Union on 1 January 2007.  
21
See the Micula award (n.6), para.219, 224 and also the Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1470 of 30 
March 2015, (n.13), paras.16-18. 
 6 
investment regime took effect on 22.02.2005, four years before the scheme’s 
scheduled expiry in 2009, resulting in the reaction of the investors and subsequently 
in the dispute in question.22 
During the proceedings, although the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal was 
not challenged on the ground of a clash between the applicable BIT and EU law,23the 
tribunal had to confront with the applicability on the EU law on the merits.24Put 
simply, Romania argued that the revocation of the incentives was necessary for the 
accomplishment of Romanian accession and thus the interpretation of the BIT 
should be consistent with Romania’s obligations under the Europe Agreement and 
the EU Treaty. Romania added that in case the tribunal adopted that the obligations 
under the BIT and the EU law could not be reconciled, the later would prevail.25The 
Micula brothers asserted that there was no conflict between the BIT and EU law, but 
if there were, the conflict should be only with Europe Agreement since Romania had 
not yet acceded to the EU during the disputed period. Therefore, EU law was not 
directly applicable and in any case, the BIT should prevail.26However, since EU law 
was considered by the parties as a part of the “factual matrix” of the case,27the 
tribunal held that when interpreting a BIT, “the general context of EU accession must 
be taken into account” so as to rule whether Romania’s actions were reasonable or 
the expectations of investors were legitimate.28Although the tribunal concluded that 
                                                     
22
The factual background of this case is concisely presented. For a better understanding of the case 
see Micula award, (n.6), pp.40-85; M. Swiqtkowski, ‘Comment on Ioan Micula and others v. Romania 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20)’, Polish Review of International and European Law, Vol.2, Issue 4, 2013, 
pp. 121-123; A. Ghouri, Interaction and Conflict of Treaties in Investment Arbitration, International 
Arbitration Law Library, Vol.32, 2015, pp.170-171. 
23
ICSID Case No ARB/05/20, Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula, SC European Food SA, SC Starmill SRI, SC 
Multipack SRL v Romania, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 24 September 2008.  
 
24
Although the parties agreed that the substantive provisions of the BIT would be the governing law of 
the dispute, they disagreed with respect to the role of the EU law in the interpretation of the BIT, see 
Micula award, (n.6), paras.288, 289. 
25
Micula award,(n.6), paras.303-312. 
26
Micula award,(n.6), paras.391-302. 
27
Micula award,(n.6), para.328. 
28
Micula award, (n.6), para.327.  
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Romania’s policy was rational29due to its imminent accession to the EU, it held that 
the investors were treated unfairly due to Romania’s failure to act transparently 
regarding the timely information of investors for the premature revocation of the 
incentives and thus resulting to a breach of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard under the art.2(3) of the BIT.30 
However, the end of story has not yet been written. On 20 February 2014, 
Romania had partially implemented the award by offsetting its debt with tax duties 
of S.C. European Food S.A, owned by Micula.31On 18 April 2014, Romania requested 
the annulment of the award under art.52 of ICSID Convention before an ad hoc 
committee and the stay of the enforcement of the award until the committee had 
decided on the application for annulment. The later issued a decision on the 
continuation of the stay of the enforcement of the award subject to the condition of 
fully compliance with the award. Romania’s failure to provide such assurance led to 
the revocation of this decision.32On 26 May 2014, the EC issued a suspension 
injunction against Romania, ordering it to refrain from executing fully the award, 
until the formal investigation under art.108(2) TFEU will be completed regarding 
whether the partial implementation of the award and any further payment would 
constitute illegal state aid or not.33The EC affirmed, once the investigation is 
completed, that the partial payment of the award constituted illegal state aid under 
art.107(1) TFEU due to the notification breach of art.108(3) TFEU,34ordering the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
29
Micula award, (n.6), para.827. 
 
30
Micula award, (n.6), para.872. 
 
31
The tax debt was amounted to RON 337.492.864 (EUR 76 million), see Commission Decision (EU) 
2015/1470 of 30 March 2015, (n.13), para.2. 
 
23
Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1470 of 30 March 2015, (n.13), para.28. 
 
33
Letter of European Commission of 1 October 2014, 6848 final, ‘State aid SA. State aid 
SA.38517(2014/C) (ex 2014/NN) – Romania Implementation of Arbitral award Micula v Romania of 11 
December 2013’, paras.1-76, available from 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/254586/254586_1595781_31_11.pdf, (accessed on 
14-11-2015). 
 
34
Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1470 of 30 March 2015, (n.13), para.141. 
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recovery of any compensation paid to Micula brothers.35The later requested the 
annulment of the issuance of the injunction before the General Court of the CJEU.36 
Apart from this, they requested the recognition and enforcement of the 
award before the Bucharest Tribunal which allowed the execution of the award 
pursuant to art.54 of the ICSID Convention despite their obligation to comply with 
the Commission Decision.37As a result, on 5 January 2015, the court-appointed 
executor seized the amount of RON 36.484.232 from Romania’s Ministry of Finance, 
transferring the amount of RON 34.004.232 to Micula brothers and keeping the 
remainder for the execution costs. From 5 February to 25 February 2015, the 
amount of RON 9.197.482 was seized from the Ministry of Finance and on 9 March 
2015 the amount of RON 472.788.675 had been voluntarily transferred to Micula 
brothers.38Furthermore, Mr. Viorel Micula sought ex parte recognition of the award 
before United States District Court for the District of Columbia, but the later held 
that the ICSID award creditor must file a plenary action in order to recognize an ICSID 
award.39On the contrary, the application for ex parte recognition of the award 
before the New York District Court was successfully granted to the rest petitioners of 
Micula arbitration, while Mr. Viorel Micula was permitted to intervene in the 
enforcement action.40 
The fully implementation of the award by Romanian authorities41and ergo 
Romania’s decision to comply with ICSID Convention instead of complying with the 
EU legal order shows that Romania chose to respect its international obligations. A 
breach of art.54 of ICSID Convention which requires each Contracting State to 
recognize the award as binding and enforce its pecuniary obligations as if it were a 
                                                     
35
Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1470 of 30 March 2015, (n.13). paras.154-161.  
36
See n.11. 
37
Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1470 of 30 March 2015, (n.13), para.35. 
38
See Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1470 of 30 March 2015, (n.13), paras.31-38. 
39
Viorel Micula v Government of Romania, No. 1:14-cv-00600, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64461, 18 May 2015. 
40
Ioan Micula et.al.v Government of Romania,No. 15 MISC. 107, 2015 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 102907, 5 August 
2015. 
41
Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1470 of 30 March 2015, (n.13), para.42. 
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final judgment, could undermine the investor’s trust to arbitration42as a dispute 
resolution mechanism and it would provoke its political embarrassment and a 
serious strike in Romania’s foreign investment policy as well.43  
 
 
 
                                                     
42
P. Comsa, ‘Enforcing arbitral awards in Romania-always a challenge’, Challenges of the Knowledge 
Society, Private Law, p.193, available from 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:vD8a7H6px58J:cks.univnt.ro/uploads/cks 
2015_articles/index.php%3Fdir%3D02_privat_law%252F%26download%3DCKS%2B2015_privat_law_
art.027.pdf+&cd=17&hl=el&ct=clnk&gl=gr, (accessed on 20-11-2015). 
 
43
S. Lehmann, ‘Commission Decision, The latest twist in the Micula saga’, International Arbitration 
Review, 2015, p.23. 
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CHAPTER II. EU LAW CHALLENGES TO INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 
UNDER A BIT DUE TO ACCESSION OF CEE COUNTRIES TO EU.  
After the EU enlargement and the EU’s acquisition of exclusive competence 
for foreign direct investment under art.207 TFEU,44doubts were raised regarding the 
conformity of existing BITS, protecting foreign investments of the newly acceded 
MSs, with the EU legal order. EU law challenges to investor-state arbitration were 
presented by the respondent states and the EC before arbitral tribunals45concerning 
the validity and the applicability of these BITs, already transformed to intra-EU BITs, 
since they were regarded as “an anomaly within the EU internal 
market”.46Arguments against the applicability of substantive BIT provisions due to 
their conflict with EU law were asserted, whereas the enforceability of the arbitral 
awards within the EU was doubted due to supremacy of EU law. The main 
arguments47will be highlighted in order to realize where the European investment 
path leads48since the EC insists for the termination of the existing intra-EU BITs.49   
                                                     
44
J. Kleinheisterkamp, ‘The future of the BITs of European Member States after Lisbon’, ASA Bulletin, 
Vol.1, 2011, p.212. 
 
45
Eastern Sugar B.V. v. The Czech Republic, SCC No. 088/2004, Partial Award, 27 March 2007; Binder v. 
Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction, 6 June 2007; Oostergetel and Laurentius v. Slovak 
Republic, UNCITRAL, Decision on  Jurisdiction, 13 April 2010, cited in E. Böhm, M.C. Motaabbed, 
‘Chapter IV: Investment Arbitration, The European Union and the Unloved BITs of its Member States’, 
in C. Klausegger, P.Clein, et al.(eds.), Austrian Yearbook on International Arbitration, 2014, p.383; 
Eureko B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2008-13 (later known as Achmea B.V. v. 
The Slovak Republic). 
 
46
Eureko v Czech Republic, PCA, Case No.2008-13, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension, 
26 October 2010, para.177; see also European Commission, ‘Monitoring Activities and Analysis, 
Bilateral Investment Treaties between Member States’, available from 
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1. EU LAW CHALLENGES ON THE JURISDICTION : THE VALIDITY AND THE 
APPLICABILITY OF INTRA-EU BITS. 
1.1. EU law challenges concerning the very validity of intra-EU BITs. 
 
The invalidity argument against intra-EU BITs rested on the regulation of 
capital movements between MSs, since there is an overlap between the BIT 
provisions and the provisions of free movement of capital under art.63 et seq. 
TFEU50which are both protecting foreign investments.51 
Under international law, this overlap poses the question of termination or 
suspension of intra-EU BITs under art.59 VCLT, since the accession constitutes a new 
agreement between the two MSs concerning the same subject matter. Nevertheless, 
coverage of the same issue does not suffice for a termination or suspension of a 
treaty by a subsequent treaty under art.59 VCLT.52The crucial element is the 
intention of the states that the matter in question should be regulated by the later 
treaty or the incompatibility of the treaties is so apparent and thus, they cannot 
apply simultaneously.  
With regard to the subject matter in consideration, the BIT provisions pursue 
to promote investments by securing the protection of investors once the investment 
                                                                                                                                                        
International Law’, American Review of International Arbitration, Vol.23, 2012, pp.149-154; M. 
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48
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http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/scujil/vol12/iss1/8, (accessed on 24-11-2015). 
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has been made, whereas art. 63 TFEU safeguards the elimination of obstacles for 
cross-border capital movements and forbids any investment measure that 
constitutes an obstacle.53Apart from their different purpose, they differ on the fact 
that BITs provide also arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism not only 
between the states but also between the investor and the host state. This unique 
characteristic of BITs cannot be ignored so as to naively assume that the common 
intention of parties was that the investments would exclusively regulated by art.63 
TFEU.54Under EU law, this overlap is not sufficient to challenge the validity of an 
intra-EU BIT. Only a breach upon an exclusive competence of the EU to govern all 
matters concerning the free movement of capital between MSs would suffice, which 
is not the case in the internal market area, since the Union has shared competency 
with the MSs.55 
Consequently, it is apparent that the very validity of intra-EU BITs is kept 
intact by the accession of CEE states to EU under EU law and international law.56 
 
1.2. EU law challenges concerning the inapplicability of intra-EU BITs on the 
ground of discrimination. 
 
The inapplicability of intra-EU BITs due to discrimination is premised under 
the arguments of the EC that the standards of investor protection under BITs 
compared to the respective provisions of EU law, might lead to unequal treatment of 
investors among MSs. Moreover, the advantage of investors having an additional 
forum to pursue their claims before tribunals strikes with the principle of non-
discrimination on the ground of nationality under art.18 TFEU.57 
 With respect to the enhanced protection of investors under BITs leading to a 
clash with EU law, a conflict is not existent. Although there is an overlap between the 
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rights provided under BITs and EU law, the protection afforded is not the same. As 
EU law provides the minimum standards of protection, a higher level of protection 
under a BIT would not be a hurdle. In a similar vein, a lower protection under a BIT 
than under EU law would not be challenged.58BITs can only provide additional 
protection which is a priori consistent with the aim of TEU.59Therefore, the mere 
difference in the standards of protection cannot suffice for rendering an intra-EU BIT 
as invalid and inapplicable.   
The equality of treatment might be distorted with regard to the enforcement 
of foreign investors’ rights. Violation of investors’ rights under art.63 TFEU could be 
brought before a court with a potential reference to the CJEU or alternatively the EC 
could initiate infringement proceedings against the State concerned. However, an 
investor protected by a BIT has the privilege of submitting its claims before an 
arbitral tribunal independent from the violating host state. This preferential 
treatment under a BIT could not be incompatible with EU law and even if there 
would be a clash with EU law, this is not capable of rendering the BIT inapplicable.60  
 
1.3. EU law challenges concerning the inapplicability of intra-EU BITs on the 
ground of infringement upon CJEU competence. 
 
The argument against the applicability of intra-EU BITs is based on the 
premise that arbitration clauses into BITs have been emasculated due to 
jurisdictional monopoly of the CJEU in matters reserved for the Union under art.344 
TFEU. This argument, although supported in MOX Plant case,61has not room in the 
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BIT context. This ruling does not pertain to investor-state disputes,62since there are 
not EU law rules conferring an exclusive competence to CJEU upon such disputes. In 
addition, the BIT that it had to be applied by the tribunal does not belong to EU legal 
order, namely with the meaning of “Treaty” under art.344 TFEU.63 
A concern was also expressed due to the existing overlap between the BITs 
provisions and the provisions in internal market under EU law. Because of this 
overlap, state measures infringing art.63 TFEU may be challenged before tribunals 
instead of national courts. Therefore, the CJEU would not have the opportunity to 
rule upon EU law matters, due to the ineligibility of tribunals to submit a reference 
for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU under art.267 TFEU. However, a potential forum 
shopping or misapplication and ignorance of EU law by a tribunal cannot justify the 
jurisdictional inapplicability of intra-EU BITs, since there are adequate mechanisms 
to secure the application of EU law.64For example, the EC could safeguard the legal 
integrity of EU legal order by initiating proceedings against a MS, which in execution 
of the award, would violate EU law. This happened in the Micula case with the 
issuance of a suspension injunction by the EC against Romania. Furthermore, 
arbitration mechanisms in intra-EU BITs do not confer exclusive jurisdiction to 
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tribunals excluding any procedure before national courts, if it is provided under 
national law.65A court also seized with the enforcement of an award, may resort to 
the CJEU for a correct application of EU law or even the arbitral tribunal may be 
granted the right to referral to the CJEU.66However, the CJEU generally refuses to 
recognize arbitral tribunals in voluntarily arbitrations as courts or tribunals with the 
meaning of art.267 TFEU. 
 
2. EU LAW CHALLENGES ON THE MERITS: THE APPLICABILITY OF EU LAW IN 
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION. 
The tension between EU law and investment arbitration was revealed not 
only through jurisdictional defenses against the validity and applicability of intra-EU 
BITs before arbitral tribunals, but also when EU law was presented as a defense for 
violations of substantive provisions of BITs and in particular of the legitimate 
expectations of investors. However, the applicability of EU law in investment 
disputes was addressed with different approaches by arbitral tribunals.67  
In particular, in Eastern Sugar68the tribunal, considering the relationship of 
national and international law, stated that “international law generally applies”,69 
without mentioning EU law at all. Hence, it failed to specify whether EU law is 
considered as subsystem of international law or as a law in force of the Contracting 
State in question under the BIT. In any case, EU law fell in the scope of the applicable 
law under the BIT.70In AES Summit,71the tribunal, being aware of the dual nature of 
                                                     
65
E. Böhm, M.C. Motaabbed, (n.45), p.381. 
66
T. Eilmansberger, (n.47), pp.521-523, 535-536. 
67
H. Wehland, (n.3), pp.300-307. 
68
In this case, Eastern Sugar had invested in the Czech sugar industry. Due to imminent accession of 
Czech Republic to the EU in 2004, it introduced measures reducing its domestic sugar production 
quotas. Eastern Sugar commenced arbitration proceedings against the Czech Republic under the 
Dutch-Czech Republic BIT, asserting that these measures breached the standard of fair and equitable 
treatment. The tribunal indeed found that it was a breach of BIT. See M. Burgstaller, 2010, (n.47), 
pp.455-464 for a detailed analysis of this case which is focusing on the arguments raised against the 
validity of intra-EU BIT in question. 
69
Eastern Sugar B.V. v. The Czech Republic, (n.45), paras.196-197. 
70
M. Burgstaller, 2010, (n.47), p.468. 
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EU Law, namely as international law and as a part of national legal orders, 
considered EU law as a fact, asserting that domestic law cannot justify breaches of 
international obligations.72So, the tribunal implied that EU law was part of domestic 
law and as a result, investment law trumped EU law.73In Micula,74the tribunal took 
EU law into account as a “factual matrix” of the case so as to assess whether 
Romania acted reasonably or the investors had indeed legitimate expectations.75In 
Electrabel,76the tribunal found EU law as a part of the applicable law, namely that it 
is part of international law as regional international law.77Surprisingly, the tribunal 
asserted that ECT should be interpreted with harmony with EU law,78treating EU law 
both as a matter of law and as a fact.79  
This lack of inconsistency of the applicability of EU law in investment treaty 
arbitration mirrors the parochial stance of arbitral tribunals towards EU law and their 
failure to balance the interplay of EU law with investment law by countervailing the 
interests of EU with the investor’s legitimate expectations. The tribunal in Micula 
arbitration is a step to the right side of the investment path,80since instead of taking 
as a blanket rule the non-breach of an investor’s legitimate expectations due to 
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compliance with EU law-an approach taken in Electrabel-, it recognized that 
investor’s expectations, regarding the governance of a EU candidate country, cannot 
rely only on the fact of a conclusion of a Europe Agreement, but it attached 
importance to the need of candidate EU states to make credible commitments.81         
                    
 3. EU LAW CHALLENGES TO ENFORCEMENT OF INVESTMENT ARBITRAL AWARDS: 
COMPENSATION AWARDS VIS-À-VIS ART.107 TFEU.  
Because of the blinkered attitude of tribunals towards EU law, the later may 
be misapplied, it may not be applied at all or it may be misinterpreted leading to 
false conclusions concerning the existence of a breach of substantive BIT provisions. 
The supremacy of EU law may be also stepped aside or the awards rendered may be 
unenforceable within EU.82The unenforceability of the award was highlighted in 
Micula due to the alleged conflict between EU state aid law and compliance with 
intra-EU ICSID arbitral awards. However, the tribunal failed to engage with EU law 
and the enforceability of the award with a mere citation of the art.53 and 54 of ICSID 
Convention.83This unanswered question by the tribunal, namely whether compliance 
with intra-EU arbitral award violates or not art. 107(1) TFEU will be discussed 
through case law, arguing that compliance of a MS with intra-EU compensation 
arbitral awards does not constitute a violation of EU state aid law, while compliance 
with intra-EU compensation arbitral awards mandating indirectly the introduction of 
illegal state aid amounts to a violation of EU state aid law.  
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3.1. The General Rule: Compliance with intra-EU investment arbitral awards 
does not constitute a violation of art.107 TFEU.    
According to art.107(1) TFEU “any aid granted by a MS or through State 
resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition 
by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far 
as it affects trade between MSs, be incompatible with the internal 
market.”84Applying this article, the doctrine of imputability, as developed by CJEU 
and EC decisions, dictates that only voluntarily measures fall within the scope of this 
article.85Therefore, compensation granted by a MS to a private investor is not 
qualified as an economic advantage attributable to a state once there is an 
obligation for compensation.86The question is if the doctrine of imputability is also 
applicable to the context of intra-EU awards. Although the doctrine of imputability in 
relation to obligation for compensation is referred to court judgments, there is no 
reason to exempt a priori its application to investment arbitration, since arbitral 
awards have comparable effects to court judgments.87In support of this conclusion a 
closer look at the relevant jurisprudence of the CJEU is considered necessary. 
In Asteris88the CJEU held that “State aid…is fundamentally different in its 
legal nature from damages which the competent national authorities may be ordered 
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to pay to individuals in compensation for the damage they have caused to those 
individuals.”89Thus, a contribution by a MS does not violate EU state aid law if there 
is an obligation for payment. However, the CJEU did not shed light on whether “the 
fundamental difference” lied on the existence of a right of compensation under 
national law or on the fact that state liability was recognized by a court. The later 
was addressed in Akzo Nobel90where the EC concluded that the payment of 
compensation is not illegal state aid, notwithstanding it has been ordered by a court, 
as long as the payment is compensatory for a wrongness incurred to an undertaking 
and the later has a right to it, recognizable by the courts, under the applicable 
law.91Thus, imputability of a state is excluded when compensation is voluntarily 
afforded to a recipient due to the existence of a legal obligation, written or 
not,92without having to resort to a national court. 
Nevertheless, reliance to Akzo Nobel requirements might be problematic in 
investment arbitration due to the broad wording of protective standards enshrined 
in BITs.93In light of this, only the case of awarding compensation by an arbitral 
tribunal due to a breach of an investment agreement could warrant the exclusion of 
imputability of a state, having an obligation to pay damages under the applicable 
treaty.94Therefore, once the award has been rendered, the EC must consider the 
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international obligations undertaken by a MS as binding, since there is no reason to 
treat differently the MSs’ obligations stemming either from international law or 
domestic law. To be more precise, this is evident in cases where a MS incorporates 
the international obligations found in international investment agreements into 
domestic law. However, imputability is ruled out not only in the case when a MS has 
ad hoc incorporated its international obligations into its domestic law, but also when 
a MS follows the model of automatic standing corporation to the extent that it 
recognizes an international investment agreement as a source of law within its 
hierarchy of rules, having direct effects domestically.95 
The relationship between compensation attributable to a state with state aid 
law was not only discussed in Asteris. In Denkavit, where the state repaid charges 
which have been wrongly levied, the CJEU held “that a national tax system which 
enables the taxpayer to contest or claim repayment of tax does not constitute an aid 
with the meaning of art.92 of the Treaty”.96Moreover, attribution is excluded in case 
of expropriation, since the compensation granted to the recipient is prerequisite for 
the legality of expropriation. Thus, the EC argued in ThyssenKrupp that 
“compensation granted by the State for an expropriation of assets does not normally 
qualify as State aid”.97The same point of reference in these cases is the existence of 
obligation under domestic law to compensate private actors because of illegal or 
potential illegal state action. In such cases, the payment is not voluntary and does 
not infringe art.107 TFEU. The legal situation in these cases is analogous with those 
of ICSID arbitral awards with the only difference that in the later, the obligation for 
compensation derives from international law. So, the principles portrayed in these 
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cases could be applied in investment arbitration since any differentiation between 
obligations derived from domestic law and international law is 
irrational.98Furthermore, another argument in favour of respecting equally the 
international obligations undertaken by a MS could be found in Deutsche 
Bahn99where the CJEU held that a measure is not imputable to the state if that MS is 
obliged under EU law to implement it without discretion.100In a similar vein, it could 
be argued that a MS which complies with an arbitral award is merely honoring its 
supranational obligations. However, this assertion is valid with respect to ICSID MSs 
due to their lack of autonomy concerning the enforcement of arbitral awards 
according to art.53 and 54 of ICSID Convention, since the enforcement of non-ICSID 
awards can be impeded due to the public policy exception under art.V(2)(b) of 
NYC.101     
Consequently, not only compliance with a domestic obligation, but also 
compliance with an international obligation to compensate does not contravene 
with art.107 TFEU. Accordingly, compliance with intra-EU investment arbitral awards 
does not constitute illegal state aid, since the deference towards the legislative 
framework enacted under national law and international investment agreement 
must be the same in the context of EU state aid law regarding the doctrine of 
imputability. 
3.2. Exception to the General Rule: Compliance with intra-EU investment 
arbitral awards, establishing indirectly an illegal state aid, constitutes a violation       
of art.107 TFEU. 
Although compliance with intra-EU investment arbitral awards does not 
generally constitute illegal state aid, there is an exception to this rule in order to 
avoid the easily circumvention of prohibition of EU state aid law. In other words, 
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compliance with an award constitutes illegal state aid in cases where the 
compensation ordered by the tribunal indirectly establishes illegal state aid.102 
This was the case in Micula arbitration where the payment of compensation 
to investors amounted to a re-installment of the same economic benefit which was 
repealed due to its conflict with EU state aid law.103In particular, the EC concluded, 
after the conduction of its formal investigation, that the claimants constituted an 
undertaking with the meaning of art. 107 TFEU as they formed one economic unit, 
engaging with economic activities.104The execution of the award by Romania to 
these certain claimants would confer to them a selective105economic advantage, not 
otherwise available on the market.106The compensation corresponded exactly to the 
privileges foreseen under the repealed EGO24 scheme from the moment it was 
abolished until its expiry107because the damages awarded on the rationale that “the 
claimant must be placed back in the position it would have been in all probability but 
for the international wrong.”108The existence of economic advantage is not 
precluded on the fact that damages were ordered due to a breach of the BIT, since 
the application of EU state aid law109cannot be frustrated by giving effect to 
obligations arising out of an intra-EU BIT. The fact that aid is granted with the 
execution of the award is irrelevant since aid can be given in “any form 
whatsoever”110though state recourses,111such as in the case of Romania. The later 
implemented the award through voluntarily direct payments, by setting off part of 
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compensation against taxes owned by one of the claimants and by transferring 
assets though court-ordered execution.112As a result, according to the EC, the 
measure is undeniably imputable to Romania.113Finally, the EC acknowledging that 
the execution of the award would confer an advantage capable of distorting 
competition and effecting trade between MSs, concluded that the implementation 
of the award was a “new aid”114which has unlawfully been put into effect in violation 
of art. 108(3) TFEU.115 
Arguments in favour of the existence of an exception to the general rule 
cannot be found only in investment arbitration. In the Joined Cases C-346/03 and C-
529/03, the company concerned asked compensation by a MS which granted state 
aid without notifying the EC and thus, state aid had to be repaid.  Advocate General 
Ruiz-Jarobo Colomer opined that “if an entitlement to compensation is recognized, 
the damage cannot be regarded as being equal to the sum of amounts to be repaid, 
since this would constitute an indirect grant of the aid found to be illegal and 
incompatible with the common market.”116Violation of EU state aid law can also be 
established in cases where the payment is not only compensatory but it is a 
mechanism of indirectly granting state aid, as in ThyssenKrupp. In this case, Italy, 
which compensated some electricity companies due to their nationalization through 
implementation of an open-ended energy tariff scheme, was found to violate art.107 
TFEU, since the measure was not merely compensatory but it was qualified as an 
operating aid.117In a similar vein, the EC found that measures which do not 
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exclusively aim to compensate private actors, but an operating aid was concealed, 
constitute illegal state aid,118as in the case regarding the reunification of the city of 
Berlin. 
Consequently, these cases portray that the existence of a legal obligation for 
payment does not suffice for the exclusion of imputability of a state when the 
measure in question indirectly grants state aid under the guise of compensation. The 
extent of damages awarded119and the existence of a side aim other than mere 
compensation120are crucial indicators for the determination of the compatibility of 
the measure with EU state aid law. Therefore, the enforcement of intra-EU 
investment arbitral awards constitutes illegal state aid when they indirectly grant 
illegal state aid instead of simply compensating the private actors. 
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CHAPTER III. RECONCILING EUROPEAN LAW POLICY WITH                      
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW POLICY. 
The intersection of EU law exigencies with the exigencies of investment 
arbitration led to a perpetual rivalry. However, it is questionable whether this rivalry 
will end up having a winner. Neither the ignorance of EU law by arbitral tribunals nor 
the dominance of EU law principles over the principles of the law of international 
arbitration would be considered as a victory of international arbitration law or 
European law respectively. Only the effective protection of the disputed parties in 
BIT proceedings could be considered as a victory and it cannot be achieved without 
treating these fields of law with equal respect.  
Their harmonious co-existence would be accomplished with the correct 
application of EU law by arbitral tribunals in the context of BITs. The first option to 
secure this would be to grant arbitration panels seated in MSs the status of the court 
of tribunal with the meaning of art. 267 TFEU.121The recourse to make a reference to 
the CJEU for a preliminary ruling when EU law issues emerged would be effective 
only if tribunals would accept the primacy of EU law and the exclusive right of the 
CJEU to interpret it.122For the time being, the case law of the CJEU123constitutes a 
hindrance and reconsideration of the ability of arbitral tribunals’ right to referral to 
the CJEU124would be a first step to bridge the gap between EU law and international 
arbitration practice. A second option would be the institution of infringement 
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proceedings by the EC under art.258 TFEU against MSs which disregard the 
mandatory application of EU law.125This was the case in Micula arbitration where the 
issuance of award misapplying the MSs’ EU law obligations led the EC to exercise a 
suspension injunction126and initiate the first stage of these proceedings by sending a 
letter of formal notice, requesting Romania to terminate its intra-EU BIT.127This 
threat of the EC, that is to take MSs to Court, may suffice to motivate tribunals to 
take into account EU law during arbitration proceedings. In contrast to these 
options, the last one requires direct intervention in the enforcement stage of an 
arbitral award.128This option will be discussed in the following sections addressing 
the legal issues that arise in the enforcement of intra-EU ICSID and non-ICSID awards 
which are incompatible with EU law and in particular with competition law with the 
aim of reconciling the policies of EU law and law of international arbitration in this 
respect.           
 
1. ENFORCEMENT OF “MICULA-TYPE” ICSID AWARDS: ICSID CONVENTION AND EU 
LAW IN A GAME OF THRONES. 
The framework of ICSID Convention constitutes a threat of the integrity and 
autonomy of EU legal order with respect to the enforcement of intra-EU awards. 
According to art.53 and 54 of ICSID Convention, the award shall be binding on the 
parties, being subject only to any appeal or remedy provided for in the Convention. 
Moreover, each Contracting State is obliged to recognize an award as binding and to 
enforce its pecuniary obligations imposed as if it were a final judgment of the court 
of that state. The self-contained review system of the Convention requiring 
unconditional enforcement of the ICSID awards mirrors that not even the public 
policy of the forum of the Contracting State, premised on EU law principles, could 
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prevent their recognition and enforcement, as opposed to non-ICSID awards which 
are subject to NYC.129  
The reliance of Micula tribunal to these articles and its reluctance to engage 
with EU law and the enforceability of an intra-EU ICISD award contravening with EU 
state aid law led Romania to a dilemma, namely to honor ICSID Convention and 
comply with the award or to respect the primacy of EU law and refuse to implement 
it. Such a dilemma would not be existed if the tribunal would have unfolded the legal 
issues of the enforcement of intra-EU ICSID awards taking into consideration both EU 
law and ICSID Convention. The complex interplay of these competitive legal orders 
will be analyzed based on two factors, namely the angle from which it is examined 
and the “nature” of EU law. The first factor concerns the viewpoint of courts of MSs 
and the EC on one hand, called as European angle and on the other hand the point of 
view of ICSID tribunals, called as international angle. The second factor refers to the 
characterization of EU law as international law or sui generis legal order and its 
relationship with ICSID Convention. The legal outcomes derived from the 
combination of these factors will be presented with a view to reconciling these legal 
orders, claiming each one superiority over the other.130   
 
1.1. EU law as international law from an international angle. 
An ICSID tribunal confronted with the enforceability of an intra-EU ICSID 
award will opt for the international angle, since it is not bound by EU law but by the 
ICSID Convention and the applicable BIT131which are “creatures” of international law. 
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An ICSID EU MS is bound to respect EU law and the obligations arising from art.53 
and 54 of ICSID Convention simultaneously. These exclusive obligations are in 
conflict only if enforcement of an ICSID award leads to circumvention of EU law, such 
as in cases of “Micula-type” awards.132If an ICSID tribunal regards EU law as 
international law, the later is governed by international law, as it is provided by art.1 
VCTL. The international origination of EU law133was affirmed in Van Gend and Loos 
when the CJEU characterized EU law as “a new legal order of international law”134or 
in the words of AG Maduro in Kadi as “a municipal legal order of transnational 
dimensions”.135It is regarded as a self-contained regime of international law,136as an 
international organisation which restrains sovereignty of MSs through the principles 
of direct effect and primacy of EU law,137premised on its founding treaties which are 
international agreements.138 
Regarding EU law as international law, its relationship with ICSID Convention, 
which is a multilateral international treaty between MSs and third states,139will be 
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governed by the conflict of rules of international agreements140under art.30(2) and 
(4) VCTL.141Although art. 30(2) VCLT provides for the subordination of the treaty 
which has a clause conceding priority over the other treaty, it does not impede 
States from stipulating a clause conferring superiority to another treaty.142Such a 
clause does not exist in EU Treaties so as to grant superiority over the ICSID 
Convention. Nevertheless, according to Hindelang, it is argued that “by means of 
interpretation of the European Treaties on the basis of Article 31(3)(b) 
VCLT143relating to subsequent practice in the application of the treaty, including 
judicial activities, which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation – an inherent conflict rule in EU law”144might be concluded.  Relying 
on the principle of primacy of EU law over national law, the inapplicability of the 
later is inevitable in case of its incompatibility with EU law. In a similar vein, this 
could be applied to international treaties between MSs. Actually, this was addressed 
in Commission v Italy, where it was held that “in matters governed by the EEC Treaty 
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(now TFEU), that Treaty takes precedence over agreements concluded between MSs 
before its entry into force.”145  
Assuming that the principle of primacy of EU law is considered as a clause 
claiming superiority over ICSID Convention, the later is inapplicable between MSs to 
the extent that it is incompatible with EU law, as art.30(2) VCLT requires. The 
inapplicability of ICSID Convention arises also under art.30(4) VCLT even in the case 
that we deduce that there is not an implicit priority clause in the Treaty of 
Lisbon.146Consequently, ICSID tribunals would render the ICSID Convention 
inapplicable once it would be in conflict with EU law, since the Lisbon Treaty is lex 
posterior to the ICSID Convention.147    
 
1.2. EU law as international law from a European angle. 
An EU MS court seized with the enforcement of an ICSID award would 
consider the status of ICSID Convention within the EU through EU law rules, since it 
is EU law that determines the status of international agreements within 
it.148Nevertheless, the relevant rules, namely the art.351 TFEU149and 216(2) 
TFEU,150are not applicable.151Put simply, although EU law is silent on the relationship 
of EU law with international law, art.351 TFEU constitutes a rule of conflict in order 
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to solve any incompatibility between the obligations arisen from pre-accession 
treaties of MSs and their EU law obligations in favour of the former.152However, this 
exception to the principle of supremacy of EU law, namely the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda,153applies only to agreements between MSs and third states.154Therefore, 
agreements concluded between MSs inter se cannot lead to a derogation of the 
principle of primacy of EU law.155As far as art.216(2) TFEU is concerned, ICSID 
Convention will be binding upon the EU only if a “functional succession” of the EU 
into the ICSID obligations of the MSs would occur. This presupposes that all MSs 
would be parties to the international agreement in question.156Nevertheless, this is 
not feasible since Poland is not a party to ICSID Convention. Apart from this, an 
exclusive competence of the EU is prerequisite for the functional succession, which is 
not the case in the context of dispute settlement.157 
Since these rules are inapplicable, the EU MS court, confronted with the 
enforcement of an intra-EU ICSID award, would resort to general principles regarding 
the status of international agreements between MSs. In such case, the nature of EU 
law is crucial factor. Generally, EU courts would give effect to the primacy of EU law. 
However, in case that they would regard EU law as international law, international 
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rules of conflict will apply. Under art.30(2) and (4) VCLT, ICSID Convention which 
requires unconditional enforcement of awards, is applicable “only to the extent that 
its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty”, namely the Lisbon 
Treaty. Ergo, if enforcement of ICSID awards circumvents EU law, ICSID Convention is 
in conflict with EU law and thus, inapplicable.158  
The determination of whether the enforcement of an ICSID award violates EU 
law and as a consequence whether there is a conflict between these legal orders is 
upon to courts. This kind of “review” does not override the obligation of courts not 
to scrutinize ICSID awards and to enforce them as if they were final judgments. Not 
only does not this procedure lead to any appeal or any other remedy against the 
award, but also it precedes to any assessment of obligations arisen from ICSID 
Convention,159determining its applicability or not. If this reflection indeed 
contravenes with the intention of the drafters of ICSID Convention160who wanted to 
include an implied superiority clause over other subsequent treaties, the EU court 
seized with enforcement would be confronted with two exclusive superiority 
clauses, namely ICSID superiority and EU law superiority. A MS court would generally 
uphold the primacy of EU law, as it is already mentioned.  Alternatively, an offset of 
these clauses would occur, leading again to the application of VCLT’s rules of conflict. 
Consequently, ICSID Convention would not be applicable to the extent that it is in 
conflict with EU law because Lisbon Treaty is lex posterior to ICSID Convention.161    
                                                                                                                                                               
1.3. EU law as sui generis legal order from an international angle. 
When an ICSID tribunal has to rule upon the enforceability of an ICSID award 
within the EU, it might view EU law as a sui generis legal order, as a new and 
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autonomous legal order.162Accepting the sui generis character of EU legal order, this 
by definition means that it is not international law. In such case, a conflict between 
EU law and the ICSID Convention cannot be resolved with the rules of conflict of 
VCTL, since the later refers only to international law and internal law. Ergo, its rules 
of conflict can apply analogously. If EU law is similar to international law, the VCLT’s 
rules of conflict between international treaties apply, leading to the inapplicability of 
ICSID Convention in case of conflict with EU law, as described above. However, the 
sui generis nature of EU law resembles better to domestic law and an analogous 
application of art.27 VCLT163would be appropriate in order to determine the 
relationship of these competing legal orders.164 
If EU law is treated as the internal law of a MS, art.27 VCLT provides that EU 
law cannot impede the automatic enforcement of ICSID awards, since a state cannot 
escape from its international obligations by referring to its domestic legislation. 
Nevertheless, this legal outcome would lead to impossible demands because art.27 
VCLT would require an action on behalf of Romania to change its legal regime on EU 
state aid law so as to conform to its international obligation. This is not feasible 
because MSs cannot unilaterally change EU law in areas of competence that have 
been transferred to the EU and are subject to European governance. Any change of 
EU law would be possible only with the commencement of an amendment 
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procedure according to art.48 TEU. Since, the sovereignty of MSs had been 
fragmented165in areas where the EU legislates autonomously, such as in state aid law 
rules, MSs do not have the means to comply with their international obligations. 
Art.27 VCLT could entail legal consequences only in areas where states have still 
competence to exercise their public authority, which is not the case in EU state aid 
law. Therefore an ICSID EU MS, like Romania, cannot escape from its quagmire, 
namely to respect its international and European obligations without issues of 
international responsibility raised because of the absence of rule of conflict for sui 
generis legal orders. Consequently, an ICSID tribunal, confronted with the 
enforceability of an award which is in conflict with EU state aid law, cannot assert 
that ICSID Convention would be applicable in any case due to the legal implications 
arising of ratio legis of art.27 VCLT.166 
1.4. EU law as sui generis legal order from a European angle. 
In cases where EU MS courts, dealing with the enforcement of intra-EU ICSID 
awards, have regarded EU law as a sui generis legal order, the legal situation is 
straightforward. The court initially has to scrutinize ICSID awards in order to discern 
the awards circumventing EU law from the awards conforming to EU law. As it is 
elaborated above, this kind of scrutiny does not violate art.53 and 54 of ICSID 
Convention. Once a conflict of ICSID Convention with EU law becomes a reality, such 
in Micula award, the court would resort to an analogous application of art.27 VCLT, 
since the EU law rules determining the status of international agreements within the 
EU are not applicable. If a MS court would treat EU law as domestic law under art.27 
VCLT, the legal outcome of the conflict would not be the primacy of ICSID 
Convention over EU law, since art.27 VCLT cannot determine the hierarchy of these 
orders in areas subject to European public authority, such in state aid law. Despite 
the lack of a rule of conflict determining the relationship between EU law and the 
ICSID Convention, a MS court would not leave the legal situation unresolved. Relying 
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on the Kadi judgment167and the recent jurisprudence168where the principle of the 
autonomy of EU legal order and the primacy of EU law over international law were 
strengthened, the court would generally give precedence to EU law regardless of the 
existence of an international rule granting superiority to international law because it 
is bound by EU law.169  
These approaches of the hierarchical relationship of ICSID Convention and EU 
law portray the dominating uncertainty with respect to the enforcement of intra-EU 
ICSID awards. How this uncertainty would be dissipated without an explicit rule of 
conflict? 
1.5. Moving towards to a co-ordination of these competing legal orders. 
All these legal approaches concerning the hierarchical relationship of ICSID 
Convention and EU law lead to a conundrum. Both legal orders should abdicate their 
superiority and adopt a collaborative attitude which entails respect of each legal 
order for the identity of the competing legal order. In other words, EU law has to 
honor the international obligations of MSs, claiming superiority only if the 
application of ICSID Convention jeopardizes the identity of EU legal order. In a similar 
vein, ICSID Convention has to respect the primacy of EU law in intra-EU relations, 
claiming primacy only if the application of EU law threatens the identity of ICSID legal 
order. Each legal order could triumph as long as it is factually and legally feasible. 
This approach of co-ordinating these rivaling legal orders is premised on ECtHR 
jurisprudence in Bosphorus and Gasparini. In these cases, it was held that MSs do 
not infringe the European Convention on Human Rights170as long the protection of 
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human rights by EU law is comparable to the protection of ECHR,171meaning as 
comparable that the afforded protection is not manifestly insufficient.172Applying 
the ECtHR’s approach to the investment context, we could argue that the initial task 
of tribunals is to decide whether or not the investors are comparably protected 
under EU law as they are protected under a BIT, granting or not superiority to EU 
legal order accordingly.  
The co-ordination of ICSID Convention and EU law could be also mirrored in 
the enforcement stage. Put simply, ICSID Convention cannot assert unconditional 
enforcement of ICSID awards that circumvent EU state aid law and EU law cannot 
assert absolute primacy of EU state aid law when principles of ICSID Convention are 
jeopardized. With regard to Micula-type cases, this means that only a gross and an 
evident violation of EU state aid law would impede the enforcement of an ICSID 
award. Such violation would have been established if the tribunal had granted 
damages to the investors without assessing whether they had legitimate 
expectations with respect to the continuation of a legal scheme, assailable to state 
aid. This would be mainly determined by the fact of whether the EC was notified or 
not. In addition, EU state aid law would be grossly violated if the tribunal had not 
taken into account it at all or it had misapplied it in the concerned dispute. 
Consequently, any establishment of rule of hierarchy between these orders is 
meaningless and it would lead to unsatisfactory results since both legal orders are 
determining factors in the enforcement of intra-EU ICSID awards. As such, this 
approach is premised on the conception that each legal order is equal and 
respectable, claiming superiority over the other as a principle and not as a rule. 
Therefore, it would be appropriate to examine each case individually taking into 
consideration the core principles of each legal order that might be jeopardized by 
the application of the other competing legal order.173    
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2. ENFORCEMENT OF “MICULA-TYPE” NON ICSID AWARDS. 
As it is already stated the self-contained regime of ICSID Convention, 
providing the direct enforcement of the award, does not allow its assessment from 
the perspective of ordre public.174However, this is not the case for non-ICSID awards 
which are circulated under NYC. Assuming that Micula award is a non-ICSID award, 
the EU MS courts may refuse the recognition and the enforcement of such award 
under the public policy exception of art.V(2)(b) NYC175due to Eco Swiss176doctrine. By 
analysing this notion of public policy, the question of whether competition law 
pertains to public policy will be addressed after assessing critically the criteria posed 
in Eco Swiss. Finally, a standard of review of awards raising competition law issues 
will be proposed not until the current approaches of review by courts will be 
presented.   
  2.1. The notion of public policy under art.V(2)(b) exception of NYC. 
 
 Under art.V(2)(b) NYC, a court may refuse ex officio the recognition and 
enforcement of an intra-EU non-ICSID award if the enforcement would undermine 
the public policy of the state in which is sought.177Although, it is a last resort 
defense,178it is rarely accepted due to its narrow interpretation179and the intention 
of drafters of NYC to encourage recognition and enforcement of international 
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commercial awards, known as pro-enforcement bias.180The notion of public policy is 
not defined in the context of NYC since it is has been characterized as 
chameleon,181changing with the passage of time182and due to the fact that each 
state has its own public policy.183 
It is accepted that this fluid concept184in the context of NYC is the so-called 
international public policy,185being divided into procedural and substantive public 
policy.186International public policy is differentiated from domestic policy which is 
comprised by the mandatory rules of the legal order of a state, mirroring its 
fundamental values187and being applied to purely domestic matters.  International 
public policy is a concept narrower of domestic policy,188detached from 
consideration of national interests only and being applicable in transactions where 
the element of internationality dominates. Although this notion does not exclude 
mandatory rules of domestic law, a mere violation of a mandatory rule does not 
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suffice to establish a violation of international public policy.189An attempt for a 
uniform definition of this concept was made by ILA which recommended that it is 
consisted of “fundamental principles, pertaining to justice or morality, that the State 
wishes to protect even when it is not directly concerned; rules designed to serve the 
essential political, social or economic interests of the State, these being known as 
“lois de police” or “public policy rules”; and the duty of the State to respect its 
obligations  towards other States or international organisations."190  
A further concept of public policy was developed which is narrower than 
international public policy of each state, called as transnational public policy or truly 
international public policy,191having a reference point to public international law and 
to the principles of morality and justice, generally accepted among the civilized 
nations.192Moreover, another kind of public policy was emerged, known as European 
public policy,193due to harmonization of EU law, being applied to MSs.194Although 
public policy, as a concept, encompasses the protection of the fundamental rules of 
law, European public policy is different to the public policy of each MS, since they 
serve different purposes. European public policy is to safeguard the application of EU 
law in arbitration195whereas the public policy of each MS constrains its application, 
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as provided by art.36 TFEU,196in the free movement of goods.197The existence of this 
regional public policy198was established by the CJEU in Eco Swiss, where a provision 
of EU competition law, as part of European public policy, elevated to the status of 
international public policy.199In particular, in Eco Swiss,200the CJEU held that art.81 
EC (101 TFEU) is qualified as public policy with the meaning of NYC since it is a 
fundamental mandatory provision, essential for the function of internal market in 
EU. Thus, any breach of this rule could establish a ground for refusal of recognition 
and enforcement of the award under art.V(2)(b) NYC.201However, this ruling did not 
provide any guidance with respect to which provisions of EU law and specifically 
whether any or every rule of competition law pertains to European public policy.202   
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2.2. European Public policy and Competition Law. 
The CJEU in Eco Swiss regarded art.101 TFEU not merely as a mandatory rule 
but it crowned it with the public policy title with the meaning of NYC without 
identifying the scope of public policy in this context and without providing 
unambiguously the criteria for determining the public policy character of EU law 
provision in question.203This uncertainty commenced a discussion among academics 
with regard to which rules of EU law and of competition law have a public policy 
character. 
 More specifically, Mustill and Boyd204stated that “it appears that any point of 
EEC law which is in the realm of public policy or ordre public may be raised by way of 
defence to proceedings to enforce the award”. Berger asserted that with regard to 
EU competition law rules that “there is a domestic ordre public with community law 
origin which may become relevant in setting aside any enforcement 
proceedings”.205Baumert206and Raeschke-Kessler207claimed that “all mandatory rules 
of European law are part of European public policy” while Geimer and Schütze208and 
Martiny209held that in the context of enforcement of foreign judgments, “it is not 
clear which European rules pertain to public policy”. The French Court de Cassation 
held that “only certain rules of European law pertain to international public policy 
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and are to be taken into account when granting or refusing exequatur”.210Guliano 
and Lagarde211stated with respect to the public policy provision in Article 16 Rome 
Convention that“[i]t goes without saying that this expression includes Community 
public policy, which has become an integral part of the public policy of the MSs of the 
European Community”. Idot held that some rules of European law may be qualified 
as international public policy,212whereas Schlosser moved a step further providing 
examples of European public policy, such as “art.81 ECT and  82 ECT213(now art.101 
and art.102 TFEU), the five freedoms (transnational trade, services, establishment, 
movement of capital, movement of workers); all provisions of the EC Treaty against 
discrimination based on nationality or gender; and the compensation of the agent 
according to Article 19 of the Directive 86/653/EEC on commercial agents.”214Stanič 
mentioned that the Electrabel tribunal held that “state aid is a mandatory provision 
of EU law and a provision of international public policy,”215Ortolani sustained “that 
article 107 TFEU…constitutes one of the core principles of EU competition law and 
forms EU public policy”216and finally Tietje and Wackernagel said that “Eco Swiss 
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principles include state aid”.217Consequently, the only safe conclusion that it could 
be drawn for the time being is that not every rule of European law has a public policy 
character.218  
In order to assess which rules of EU law pertain to public policy, any reliance 
on the arguments posed by the CJEU in Eco Swiss for the justification of the public 
policy character of a rule of competition law would be full of pitfalls. The CJEU, citing 
art.3(1)(g) EC of Treaty,219held that art.85 of the Treaty (101 TFEU)220is fundamental 
because of its importance for the accomplishment of the Community's goals and the 
functioning of the internal market. However, it based this argument in connection 
with art.85(2) EC of Treaty,221stressing that the fundamental nature of the rule in 
consideration derives from the provision sanctioning nullity.222These arguments, 
nevertheless, are not sufficiently persuasive.223Put simply, art.3 EC of Treaty 
enumerates merely the instruments to accomplish Community objectives,224as they 
set out in art.2 EC of Treaty.225Reliance to that article would be more appropriate 
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since it reflects the underlying principles of public policy of the Union.226Otherwise, a 
reference to art.3 EC of Treaty as a measuring stick to characterize rules as European 
public policy would mean that all EU law rules pertain to European public 
policy,227which is not in line with the general principle that refusal of enforcement 
“should be possible only in exceptional circumstances”.228The fact that the 
importance of the provision is illustrated by the sanction of nullity is not convincing, 
since it would imply that rules lacking nullity would not be important, which is not a 
convincing conclusion. Therefore, the nullity provision alone is not a sufficient 
criterion so as to characterize whether which rules of competition law are qualified 
as European public policy.229The CJEU neither mentioned the direct effect of this 
provision nor the uniform application and consequently supremacy of the EU law 
rule in question as criteria to establish the public policy character of the rule. The 
CJEU emphasized the fundamental nature of art.85(1) EC of Treaty.230Thus, the 
fundamental nature of a rule is the criterion which differentiates mandatory rules 
pertaining to European public policy from those which are not.231 
It is already held that art.101 and 102 TFEU are fundamental rules, being 
qualified as international public policy,232whereas art.107 TFEU has not explicitly 
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been characterized as public policy by the CJEU for the time being.233Although it is 
for the CJEU to answer whether state aid rules are so fundamental for the 
accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the Union in the context of the internal 
market234and under which conditions could have public policy character, in my 
opinion state aid provisions could be qualified as public policy on equal terms with 
the above mentioned provisions. As art.101 and art.102 TFEU had elevated the 
status of public policy, there is no reason to treat differently art.107 TFEU. Having an 
insight into the purpose of these articles, we could conclude that they serve the 
same ultimate aim, namely the protection of a single internal market within EU and 
the creation of a level playing field on which undertakings could compete each other 
equally. In other words, art.101 and art.102 TFEU safeguard the maintenance of a 
single internal market by preventing the distortion of competition through 
prohibition of anticompetitive agreements between undertakings and abusive 
business conduct of a dominant undertaking in a given market within the  EU. In a 
similar vein, state aid rules prohibit MSs for granting aid to undertakings that could 
confer to them a comparable advantage vis-à-vis their competitors, ensuring the 
competitiveness among undertakings within the internal market. Therefore, since 
market fragmentation and distortion of competition are deterred due to the 
existence of art.101, 102 and 107 TFEU, it would be reasonable to hold that state aid 
rules could be qualified as public policy with the meaning of NYC.    
In any case, it would be wise for courts not to be blinkered, taking the public 
policy exception of NYC as a blanket rule for the rules of competition law. In other 
words, courts should review each award with competition law issues on a case-by-
case basis since the CJEU have not yet employed a list of public policy provisions.   
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2.3. The extent of the court review of awards with competition law issues. 
 
Having as starting point that EU competition law is part of European public 
policy, the EU MS courts have to review awards with competition law issues in order 
to ascertain if the alleged violation of competition law constitutes an infringement of 
public policy and hence a ground for refusal of recognition and enforcement of the 
award. While the orthodox view, known as minimalist approach, is that awards 
should not be subject to any review on the merits by courts in the enforcement 
stage, a more interventionist approach was presented, known as maximalist 
approach, dictating an in depth-review of the award so as to enforce the 
competition law effectively.235 
The minimalist approach, premised on the second look doctrine which is 
established in Mitsubishi,236contends that the role of reviewing court is limited to 
affirm that arbitrators have addressed the emerging competition law issues in a 
competent manner without examining thoroughly the facts and the legal issues of 
the award. This approach is consistent with the arbitrability of competition law, 
respecting not only arbitration as dispute settlement mechanism but also the finality 
of awards. It is argued that even a restrained review is capable of identifying serious 
and hence unquestionable breaches of competition law, since competition policy is 
not threatened if competition law is applied in a manner dubious.237The avoidance 
of an intrusive scrutiny of the award is reflected in Eco Swiss which held that “review 
of arbitration awards should be limited”238and afterwards in Thalès v 
Euromissible239which held that only a “flagrant, effective and concrete” violation 
could impede the recognition and enforcement of an award involving competition 
law issues. The later approach was confirmed in SNF v. Cytec which was not in favour 
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of reviewing the merits.240Despite the general acceptance of this standard of review 
as the most appropriate, it was criticized on the ground that it diminishes the role of 
reviewing court.241 
 Opponents of the maximalist approach assert that a restrained review is 
capable of setting arbitration as a tool for circumventing competition law. An in-
depth review of the award derives from the public policy nature of competition law 
with a view to ensuring that arbitrators have correctly applied competition law. This 
extreme version of second look doctrine was endorsed in the Belgian Tribunal of 
First Instance in SNF v. Cytec during the annulment proceedings, in which the 
reasoning of arbitrators was reviewed in order to detect potential violations of 
public policy.242In a similar vein, the Court of Appeal of Hague in Marketing Displays 
refused to enforce the award because of the mistaken application of competition 
law by arbitrators.243The maximalist standpoint was criticized on the idea that not 
every violation or non compliance with mandatory law, as competition law, could be 
qualified as breach of international public policy. Since only serious breaches of 
competition law could justify an infringement of public policy, an in-depth review of 
the merits of an award is superfluous.244With respect to the belief of maximalists to 
apply correctly competition law, it seems not reasonable to believe that in 
sophisticated cases with competition law implications the court would always 
consider a more “correct” application of competition law than those of arbitrators, 
especially when an economic analysis of facts is to be taken into account.245Apart 
from this, the losing party in arbitration could use an allegation of violation of 
competition law under the guise of correct application of competition law as a 
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method for dilatory tactics which could endanger one of the core principles of 
arbitration, namely the finality of awards.246 
 Therefore, having as benchmark the effective enforcement of competition 
law and the safeguard of the finality of awards, a standard of review of awards by 
court could be proposed so as to balance these competing policies. 
 
2.4. An appropriate standard of review: Moving towards to a reconciliation of         
competition law and law of international arbitration demands. 
 
A standard of review of award with competition law implications under the 
public policy perspective, could reconcile competition law and law of international 
arbitration demands, once two issues would be addressed, namely which types of 
violations of competition law constitute infringement of international public policy 
and which level of scrutiny should the courts apply so as to ascertain these 
violations. 
With regard to the first issue, a reviewing court should be aware of the fact 
that not any allegation of violation of competition law could justify infringement of 
international public policy. Thus, erroneous or non application of competition law 
could not constitute breach of public policy. Only serious, concrete and effective 
violations of competition law threatening the goals of competition policy at hand, 
could be capable of refusing the enforcement of an award. Moreover, an intentional 
ignorance of competition law could be a public policy ground for refusal of 
enforcement of an award. In practice, a reviewing court should take into 
consideration that hard-core violations of competition law under art. 101 TFEU, such 
as market sharing, price fixing, or information sharing in a horizontal agreement, 
could breach EU public policy rather than a vertical restriction. In a similar vein, 
blatant abuses of dominant position under art.102 TFEU and conspicuous violations 
of state aid rules under art.107(1) TFEU could raise public policy issues.247 
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As far as state aid law is concerned, art. V(2)(b) NYC should be activated only 
in cases where the measure in question has been declared incompatible by the EC 
under art.108 TFEU. Hence, if the EC remains silent with respect to a state aid 
measure, a violation of art.107 TFEU might exist, but it may not be so manifest so as 
to breach the public policy. Therefore, the Micula award re-installing indirectly, 
through compensation, illegal state aid, violates EU public policy and consequently 
international public policy since it has been declared incompatible with internal 
market by the EC. However, we should mention that awards ordering damages for 
foregoing actions do not contravene with public policy once the anticompetitive 
behavior has ended, which is not the case in Micula.248  
With respect to the scrutiny of awards, the court should abstain from 
reviewing the merits, since a reconsideration of the dispute not only contravenes 
with the finality of awards but also provides easily a second opportunity for the 
losing party to overturn the outcome of the dispute. The court should verify through 
restrained review on the award and its reasoning that arbitrators have addressed 
competition law matters in due diligence, avoiding to ascertain if arbitrators’ 
conclusions are correct or not. The reasoning of award usually reveals the underlying 
legal and factual problems and the grounds on which arbitrators relied on their 
decision for competition law matters. Hence, a perusal of the reasoning of an award 
may portray if the tribunal allowed the continuation of an anticompetitive behaviour 
or wrongfully pardoned actions incompatible with competition policy. However, in 
exceptional circumstances, the court could review beyond the reasoning of award so 
as to evaluate if the enforcement of the award entails a violation of public policy. 
This would be appropriate for awards lacking exhaustive reasoning, in situations that 
competition law concerns have not been raised in arbitration proceedings or when 
the award itself appears legitimate on competition law perspective but there are 
indications of a concealing illegal transaction. In any case, courts should bear in mind 
that a full-fledged review on the merits is unacceptable.249 
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Consequently, the reconciliation of competition law demands with the 
demands of the law of international arbitration depends on the wisdom of the courts 
to follow a restrained review of awards with competition law issues without 
abnegating their authority to safeguard public policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 51 
CONCLUSION REMARKS  
  The issuance of the Micula award, an award rendered under ICSID 
Convention, mandating indirectly, through compensatory damages, the re-
installment of an illegal state aid opened the Bandora’s box concerning the EU law 
challenges in investor-state arbitration. The intersection of EU law and investment 
arbitration was intensified after EU enlargement with the accession of countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe to the EU. The existing BITs, having been transformed to 
intra-EU BITs, are under the threat of termination since, according to the EC, not 
only the protection afforded by the BITs is comparable to the protection provided by 
EU law in the context of single market and cross-border investments, but also they 
are incompatible with EU law.  
Several arguments by the EC and respondent states against the validity and 
the applicability of intra-EU BITs in investor-state arbitrations were stated on the 
grounds of unequal treatment of investors among MSs with respect to the privileged 
protection of investors under BITs and their right to enforce it in an additional forum, 
namely before an arbitral tribunal. Apart from these, it is argued that the 
jurisdictional monopoly of the CJEU in Union matters under art.344 TFEU is 
jeopardized due to the ineligibility of arbitral tribunals to submit a reference for a 
preliminary ruling to the CJEU under art.267 TFEU. However, investment tribunals 
uphold the validity and applicability of intra-EU BITs since the arguments raised by 
the EC through amicus curiae briefs are not convincing. With regard to EU law 
challenges on the merits, EU law had been used as a defense mechanism by states 
for breaches of investors’ legitimate expectations. Nevertheless, investment 
tribunals have the tendency to ignore or misapply EU law on the merits ruling usually 
in favour of investors. This parochial stance towards the EU law implications in 
investment disputes constitutes a hindrance to the contribution of justice since a 
reasoning of an award detached from the EU law as applicable law and as a factual 
background endangers the enforceability of award within EU. This was the case in 
Micula arbitration where compliance with such award would contravene with EU 
state aid law.      
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In general, compliance with intra-EU investment arbitral awards does not 
constitute a breach of EU state aid law. A measure could be qualified as illegal state 
aid, once it is imputable to the MS, provided that the other preconditions of 
art.107(1) are fulfilled. Hence, imputability is ruled out when a MS is merely 
complying with a legal obligation since the element of “voluntariness” does not exist 
in granting an economic benefit to an undertaking. The doctrine of imputability 
could be applied in investment arbitration, concluding that compliance with an 
award ordering compensation does not constitute illegal state aid. By way of 
exception to the general rule, compliance with an award ordering compensatory 
damages for a revoked illegal state aid breaches art.107 TFEU, since the 
compensation indirectly re-introduces the aid, namely the economic advantage that 
the investor legitimately expected under the applicable BIT. This was the case in 
Micula arbitration and thus, compliance with such award placed Romania in a 
dilemma, that is, to comply with an ICSID award and violate EU state aid law or to 
respect EU law defying the ICSID Convention which provides direct enforcement of 
the award without any further scrutiny. Although Romania chose to honor its 
international obligations by complying with the award, we cannot ignore that it is 
liable for paying illegal state aid in violation of art.107(1) TFEU.   
This quagmire could be avoided by allowing EU MS courts to scrutinize ICSID 
awards so as to identify the troublesome Micula-type cases. Such scrutiny does not 
violate art.53 and 54 of ICSID Convention because this question is anterior to the 
obligations arising from ICSID Convention. We have examined the relationship of EU 
law and ICSID Convention by the perspective of an EU MS court and a tribunal taking 
into account EU law as international law and as sui generis legal order. However, an 
EU MS court would certainly view EU law as sui generis legal order, following the 
CJEU jurisprudence and it would give primacy to EU law. Such an approach, namely 
to consciously ignore international obligations of states is unacceptable. An 
alternative approach, premised on ECtHR jurisprudence, would be a co-ordination of 
these legal orders on equal terms. Each legal order would claim superiority over the 
other, if it is legally and factually feasible. This would entail that only an obviously 
flagrant violation of art.107(1) TFEU would justify non-enforcement of an ICSID 
award. 
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With respect to non-ISCID awards, a circulation under the NYC on the prism 
of public policy perspective is inevitable. We have argued that public policy with the 
meaning of NYC is international public policy, which is a concept narrower than 
domestic policy. Due to Eco Swiss doctrine, a further concept was developed, that is 
European public policy, allowing courts to refuse the enforcement of an award that 
contravenes with EU competition law. Based on the criteria of Eco Swiss, we have 
concluded that not all EU law rules, but only the fundamental ones, comprise 
European public policy. Since the CJEU have not provided such exhaustive list of 
these rules, a court confronted with the enforcement of an award that violates EU 
law and in particular EU competition law, should adopt a restrictive interpretation of 
European public policy, assessing the fundamentality of the rule in consideration. 
Moreover, being aware of the fact that not every violation of competition law 
constitutes breach of European public policy, the court, through restrained review, 
would assess whether arbitrators dealt with competition law issues in due diligence 
and whether the enforcement of the award constitutes a serious and gross violation 
of competition law, capable of jeopardizing the public policy of the state where the 
enforcement is sought. 
Consequently, it is apparent that neither EU law nor the law of international 
arbitration is victor in the battle of the enforcement of intra-EU arbitral awards. The 
equal treatment of these legal orders and the reconciliation of EU law demands with 
the demands of the law of international arbitration would portray, through their 
uniqueness and the necessity of their existence, a new path detached from 
traditional legal rationalities.   
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